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PROHIBITING CASHLESS RETAILERS AND
PROTECTING THE IMPOVERISHED
Allison Kretovic
ABSTRACT
A growing number of customer-facing businesses have opted to
implement cashless policies, declining to accept cash for payment
and limiting consumers’ options on how they can pay for goods and
services. Proponents for cashless policies cite the efficiencies gained
by removing cash from a business and concerns about theft as their
primary reasons for supporting such policies. Opponents to the move
toward cashless express concerns that the policy is discriminatory
and has a disparate impact on lower-income consumers who do not
have access to financial institutions. Policymakers at the local and
state levels have responded by proposing and enacting legislation
prohibiting discrimination against cash buyers.
This Note examines the controversy regarding cashless policies
and the appropriate government response to this practice. This Note
argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should classify poverty as a
suspect class and apply strict scrutiny to any legislation that impacts
a low-income person’s ability to participate in the marketplace
freely. Additionally, this Note argues that Congress should enact
federal legislation to prohibit businesses from implementing cashless
policies because the policies discriminate against those who do not
have access to financial services.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 10, 2019, Mercedes-Benz Stadium, home of Major
League Soccer’s (MLS) Atlanta United FC and the National Football
League’s (NFL) Atlanta Falcons, went completely cashless,
becoming the first MLS or NFL stadium to do so.1 And it is not
alone. Across the country, a growing number of customer-facing
businesses have opted to go cashless, declining to accept dollar bills
and coins for payment and limiting consumers’ options on how they
can pay for goods and services.2 Although the majority of stores and
restaurants around the United States still accept cash, some experts
estimate that in five years, a third of all retailers will be cashless, up
from about 17% in 2019.3 About 10% of brick-and-mortar stores will
be cashless in five years, up from less than 1% in 2019.4
Businesses point to their freedom of choice and the efficiency
gained by removing cash from the establishment as justifications for
opting to go cashless.5 By eliminating the time spent counting
money, a company can serve customers faster. 6 Many businesses no
1. Simon Ogus, Mercedes-Benz Stadium Will Become First Pro Sports Venue to Go Cashless,
FORBES (Mar. 7, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/simonogus/2019/03/07/mercedes-benzstadium-will-become-first-pro-sports-venue-to-go-cashless/#70d1ab8f366a
[https://perma.cc/2JXNS8HH]; Tim Tucker, Mercedes-Benz Stadium Will Convert to Cashless Operation, ATLANTA J.-CONST.
(Mar.
8,
2019),
https://www.ajc.com/sports/mercedes-benz-stadium-will-convert-cashlessoperation/7GdA0UNpqYUrB5b4dpdNZI/ [https://perma.cc/LX97-5U7S] (“The change follows
extensive testing last year . . . . Stadium-wide, the percentage of customers using cash dropped from 42
percent at the start of the Falcons season to 30 percent at the end . . . . Cash usage has been lower at
Atlanta United games than Falcons games . . . .”).
2. CLAIRE WANG, CASH PROD. OFF. FED. RSRV. SYS., CASH ME IF YOU CAN: THE IMPACTS OF
CASHLESS BUSINESSES ON RETAILERS, CONSUMERS, AND CASH USE 3 (2019),
https://www.frbsf.org/cash/files/Cash-Me-If-You-Can-August2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9V8-NJK8]
(“In recent years, numerous businesses have made headlines for refusing to accept cash as a form of
payment. These businesses span a variety of industries, including airlines, eateries, sports stadiums, and
general merchandise stores. This phenomenon is not just limited to a few cities, either. Cashless
businesses have popped up across the country, including places like New York, Atlanta, and Chicago.”).
3. Olga Kharif & Krista Gmelich, As Amazon Leads Cashless Charge, States and Cities Push Back,
BLOOMBERGQUINT, https://www.bloombergquint.com/onweb/who-is-banning-cashless-stores-amazongo-could-be-next [https://perma.cc/F6NR-VKTF] (Mar. 30, 2019, 10:36 AM).
4. Id.
5. Wang, supra note 2, at 5 (“Particularly in high-volume businesses, these faster transaction times
can translate to increased customer satisfaction, fewer opportunities for error in making change, and
increased revenue.”).
6. Id. (“Counting cash can take time, both for the customer and the employee. Several businesses
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longer accept hard currency because handling cash can add as much
as 10% to overhead costs.7 Safety, particularly minimizing the risk of
theft or robbery, is also a top reason a business cites when making the
switch.8
Credit card companies and banks are proponents of the move
towards a cashless economy and view cash as a competitor. 9 In 2017,
Visa ran a promotion, the Visa Cashless Challenge, awarding fifty
eligible businesses in the U.S. up to $10,000 if they committed to
going cashless.10 Proponents of cashless retailers claim that a ban on
the refusal to accept cash stifles innovation and inhibits growth.11
On the other hand, opponents to cashless retailers point out that the
policy is discriminatory and impacts lower-income consumers who
do not have access to financial institutions.12 Many financial
that have gone cashless have cited benefits like faster transactions and increased store throughput.”).
7. Kharif & Gmelich, supra note 3; Wang, supra note 2, at 4 (“Small- and medium-sized
businesses are reported to pay tens of billions of dollars annually on cash handling expenses.
Eliminating cash payments eliminates the costs associated with handling and transporting cash.”).
8. Wang, supra note 2, at 4 (“Not having cash on store premises also reduces opportunities for both
internal and external robberies. . . . Externally, cash-intensive businesses can be targets for robberies.
Nearly a quarter of U.S. robberies (26 percent) took place at some type of retailer—either a gas station,
convenience store, or other commercial residence . . . . When businesses forego cash on their premises,
there may be fewer opportunities and incentives for internal and external theft.”).
9. Rey Mashayekhi, Bank of America CEO: ‘We Want a Cashless Society,’ FORTUNE FIN., at 10:34
(June
19,
2019,
5:04
PM),
https://fortune.com/2019/06/19/bank-of-america-ceo-cashless
[https://perma.cc/XQ9R-9QYQ] (“We want a cashless society. It costs us $5 billion for checks and cash
to move around our company. . . . We have more to gain than anybody in the sense from a pure
operating costs [perspective].” (quoting Bank of America CEO, Brian Moynihan)); Emily Bary, Visa’s
Plan to Vanquish Its ‘Biggest Competitor,’ BARRON’S (July 18, 2017, 8:49 AM),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/visas-plan-to-vanquish-its-biggest-competitor-1500382183
[https://perma.cc/YZ32-RVU4] (“Visa benefits considerably as consumers skip trips to the ATM. ‘Our
biggest competitor is cash,’ Avin Arumugam, Visa’s head of ‘Internet of Things’ efforts . . . told us.”).
10. Visa to Help U.S. Small Businesses Go Cashless, VISA (July 12, 2017),
https://usa.visa.com/about-visa/newsroom/press-releases.releaseId.2285993.html
[https://perma.cc/GF9F-8K23] (“Aiming to create a culture where cash is no longer king . . . Visa will
be awarding up to $500,000 to [fifty] eligible [U.S.]-based small business food service owners who
commit to joining the 100% cashless quest.”).
11. Rebeca Ibarra, New Jersey Bans Cashless Stores, WNYC NEWS (Mar. 18, 2019),
https://www.wnyc.org/story/new-jersey-bans-cashless-retailers
[https://perma.cc/B23M-RUHN]
(“‘Consumers of all income levels are able to access prepaid cards for purchasing.’ Michael Wallace,
vice president of government affairs for the New Jersey Business and Industry Association, said in a
statement. ‘As such, this law will ultimately stifle innovation and act as a further deterrent to doing
business in New Jersey.’”).
12. Ginia Bellafante, How the Cashless Economy Shuts Out the Poor, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/06/nyregion/how-the-cashless-economy-shuts-out-the-poor.html
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institutions require customers to maintain minimum account
balances, charge monthly fees, or impose penalties for overdrafting
an account.13 These types of policies make it difficult for low-income
customers to maintain bank accounts.14 Banks lack incentives to
provide options for low-income customers.15 Regulatory efforts
aimed at compelling banks to meet the needs of the poor have largely
failed.16
Other opponents cite the loss of privacy when consumers are
forced to use a credit card to make a purchase. 17 The use of electronic
transfers or debit and credit cards for “transactions allow banks,
stores, and app providers to track a person’s habits and can expose
users to fraud.”18 Additionally, as consumers increase the frequency
of their noncash transactions, their vulnerability to cyberattacks
intensifies.19 Several of the most significant cyberattacks targeted

[https://perma.cc/VFW2-G4F9] (“The strongest objection relates to the ways in which rejecting physical
currency plays out as a bias toward the poor, advancing segregation in retail environments.”); Nick
Bourke et al., Rise of Cashless Retailers Problematic for Some Consumers, PEW CHARITABLE TRS.
(Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2019/11/08/rise-ofcashless-retailers-problematic-for-some-consumers [https://perma.cc/89LS-5DQN] (“[Twenty-three]
percent of households with incomes under $50,000 say they primarily pay with cash compared with just
10 percent of households earning $50,000 or more per year.”).
13. Nadra Nittle, Why Cashless Retailers Put Low-Income People at Even More of a Disadvantage,
VOX (Nov. 30, 2018, 2:00 PM), https://vox.com/the-goods/2018/11/30/18119887/cashless-stores-cashonly-low-income-disadvantage [https://perma.cc/E2R5-RWJM].
14. Id.
15. MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION, EXPLOITATION, AND THE
THREAT TO DEMOCRACY 152–53 (Harvard Univ. Press, 2015) (“Most policymakers and scholars have
given up trying to force banks to meet the needs of the poor, claiming the cost considerations simply
prevent banks from operating in this market.”).
16. Id. (“Banking regulators have tried numerous times to induce mainstream banks to provide small
loans to the poor, but . . . these attempts have failed.”).
17. Hannah H. Kim, The Future of Cash: Will Digital Payment Systems Replace Paper Currency?,
CQ RESEARCHER (July 19, 2019), http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre2019071900
[https://perma.cc/HA6Y-QSH3] (“While digital payment methods create transaction records for each
user, cash can be anonymous, providing a measure of privacy to the purchaser. Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) rules require a cash transaction to be reported only when it exceeds $10,000. Cash is also
essentially untraceable.”).
18. Anna Kramer, NYC Pushing Ahead with Cashless Retail Ban, Joining Neighbors, BLOOMBERG
L. (June 10, 2019, 4:45 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-telecom-law/nyc-pushingahead-with-cashless-retail-ban-joining-neighbors [https://perma.cc/QB5F-LS4R].
19. Kim, supra note 17 (“[A]ttacks on financial service firms are more frequent than in other
industries[] and increased by more than 70 percent worldwide in 2017 over the previous year . . . .”).
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databases that store sensitive personal and financial information. 20
When compromised, personal and financial information can be used
for identity theft and fraud.21
In response to the rise in the number of cashless retailers, several
state and local legislators enacted bills requiring retailers to accept
cash as a form of payment. 22 This Note discusses the controversy
regarding cashless policies and the appropriate government response
to this practice. Part I examines current and proposed legislation
aimed at addressing the cashless retailer trend and the arguments for
and against cashless policies. Part II analyzes the two primary
methods of challenging cashless policies—under the Legal Tender
Act or under the Equal Protection Clause by treating wealth as a
suspect classification. Finally, Part III suggests an updated approach
to the Equal Protection Clause method by making poverty a suspect
classification and enacting federal legislation to ensure consumers
who choose to use cash retain their ability to participate in the
consumer marketplace.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History of Legislative Efforts
Massachusetts enacted a bill in 1978 prohibiting discrimination
against cash buyers. 23 Although the law has been on the books for
over forty years, it has not been actively enforced. 24 More recently,
20. Id. (“One of the largest data breaches was the 2017 hack involving Equifax, the consumer
reporting agency, in which more than 150 million customer records were stolen, including Social
Security numbers, birthdates and credit card data.”).
21. Tamara Kurtzman, Cashing Out, L.A. LAW., Mar. 2019, at 22, 26 (“In 2017 alone, more than
1,500 data breaches occurred compromising more than 170 million records, including approximately 14
million credit card numbers.”).
22. Wang, supra note 2.
23. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 255D, § 10A (2017) (“No retail establishment offering goods and services
for sale shall discriminate against a cash buyer by requiring the use of credit by a buyer in order to
purchase such goods and services. All such retail establishments must accept legal tender when offered
as payment by the buyer.”).
24. Chris Sweeney, Should Boston Stop Using Cash?, BOS. MAG. (Feb. 6, 2018, 5:44 AM),
https://www.bostonmagazine.com/news/2018/02/06/cashless-boston
[https://perma.cc/8JFR-CVGG]
(“Today, the law is a rat’s nest of red tape in which oversight and enforcement is shared between the
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Rhode Island and New Jersey passed similar legislation. 25 Oregon
and Connecticut have proposed legislation aimed at prohibiting
cashless businesses.26 Cities like New York City, San Francisco, and
Philadelphia have also passed ordinances restricting the practice. 27
Other cities, such as St. Louis and the District of Columbia, have
proposed (and even enacted) bills aimed at limiting retailers’ abilities
to reject cash payments. 28 New York City Councilman Ritchie
Torres, who introduced the NYC legislation, explained:
It is bad enough that the poor are already so stigmatized,
and now we are stigmatizing them even further for the way
they consume goods and services . . . . I talk a lot about
effective discrimination. But this amounts to intentional
discrimination, because these businesses that don’t accept
cash know exactly who they are keeping out. 29
Not all proposals have been successful, though—Chicago’s city
council declined to pass proposed legislation outlawing cashless
retailers.30
Attorney General’s Office and the Division of Banks at the Office of Consumer Affairs and Business
Regulation—and it doesn’t seem to be actively enforced. The AG’s office . . . has received only six
complaints about cashless businesses since 2013 and has taken no enforcement actions.”); Cristina
Quinn, As Society Becomes Increasingly Cashless, Is Massachusetts Ready?, WGHB (Feb. 13, 2018),
https://www.wgbh.org/news/2018/02/13/news/society-becomes-increasingly-cashless-massachusettsready [https://perma.cc/HPG5-DNGP] (“It may be somewhat ambiguous whether a restaurant
qualifies . . . . [I]t’s incumbent upon the Legislature to give us some guidance here so that we all know
whether restaurants must abide by these regulations in the era of the cashless economy. It’s up to the
Legislature to handle this and create a uniform interpretation of ‘retail establishment.’” (quoting
Northeaster University law professor Daniel Medwed)). In 2019, several lawmakers in Massachusetts
proposed legislation to repeal the prohibition against cashless retailers. S.B. 181, 191st Gen. Ct. (Mass.
2019). In February of 2020, the bill accompanied a study order, authorizing the Joint Committee on
Consumer Protection and Professional Licensure to make an investigation and study of proposed Senate
bills related to consumer protection. S.B. Order No. 2534, 191st Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2020).
25. 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-30 (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.33 (West 2019).
26. S.B. 716, 80th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019); H.B. 5703, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess.
(Conn. 2019).
27. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 20-840 (2019); PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-1132 (2019); S.F., CAL.,
POLICE CODE art. 55, §§ 5500–06 (2019).
28. St. Louis, Mo., Proposed Ordinance 47 (May 23, 2019); D.C. CODE §§ 28-5401–5404 (2021).
29. Bellafante, supra note 12.
30. Chicago, Ill., Proposed Ordinance 7145 (Oct. 11, 2017).
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While the Massachusetts and Rhode Island statutes include an
outright ban on cashless retailers, most municipal and state laws have
included exceptions in their bills. 31 Most of the bills make exceptions
for online retailers and those that are completing transactions over the
telephone or through the mail. 32 Other exceptions include airport
vendors, car rental facilities, and parking garages—sectors where
cash purchases are not possible or where cards act as a form of
collateral.33
Currently, no federal statute mandates that a private business,
individual persons, or organizations must accept cash payment for
goods or services. 34 The Coinage Act of 1965 states: “United States
coins and currency . . . are legal tender for all debts, public charges,
taxes, and dues. Foreign gold or silver coins are not legal tender for
debts.”35 The Act, however, does not require businesses to accept
cash for goods and services.36 Private businesses can choose whether
to accept cash unless there is a state law that prohibits cashless
policies.37 At the same time, courts have upheld state and local
governments’ authority to require payment for government-provided
services in certain forms.38

31. Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 255D, § 10A (2017), and 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-30 (2019)
(prohibiting any retail establishment from discriminating against a cash buyer by requiring the use of
credit), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.33 (West 2019) (prohibiting a seller from requiring a buyer to use
credit, but providing exemptions for retailers located at an airport, certain parking facilities, rental car
companies, and certain sports and entertainment venues).
32. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.33(d) (“As used in this section, ‘at retail’ shall include any retail
transaction conducted in person and exclude any telephone, mail, or Internet-based transaction.”).
33. Kramer, supra note 18.
34. Legal Tender Status, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/faqs/Currency/Pages/legal-tender.aspx (Jan. 4, 2011, 4:47 PM).
35. Coinage Act of 1965, 31 U.S.C. § 5103; see also Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 553 (1870),
abrogation recognized by Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002).
36. Legal Tender Status, supra note 34.
37. Id. (“Private businesses are free to develop their own policies on whether or not to accept cash
unless there is a State law which says otherwise. For example, a bus line may prohibit payment of fares
in pennies or dollar bills. In addition, movie theaters, convenience stores and gas stations may refuse to
accept large denomination currency (usually notes above $20) as a matter of policy.”).
38. Genesee Scrap & Tin Baling Co. v. City of Rochester, 558 F. Supp. 2d 432, 434, 436–37
(W.D.N.Y. 2008) (upholding city ordinance requiring junkyard operators to use checks for purchases
because the ordinance was a valid exercise of the city’s police power).
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B. Equal Protection Challenge
Cashless practices may raise constitutional concerns of
discrimination against the poor. 39 Under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, “no State shall . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”40 The Equal
Protection Clause applies only to state and local action, but current
U.S. Supreme Court precedent does not require the state to treat
people equally—it only requires the government to justify any
classification with a sufficient rationale. 41 The Supreme Court has
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment extends
analogous equal protection requirements to the federal government. 42
The U.S. Supreme Court’s deference to a governmental
classification within a law depends on the interest at stake. 43 There
are typically two types of classifications: facially discriminatory
classifications and facially neutral classifications.44 Facially
discriminatory classifications are found directly in the text of the law
and are challenged by showing that the law is unconstitutional in all
of its applications. 45 Facially neutral classifications may have a
discriminatory impact either from the law or from its
administration.46 If a law is facially neutral, demonstrating a
39. Kim, supra note 17 (“New Jersey Assemblyman Paul Moriarty, who supported his state’s law,
said he did so because ‘a ban on cash is discriminatory. It marginalizes the poor, marginalizes young
people who haven’t established credit yet.’”).
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
41. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (“[T]he action inhibited by the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That
Amendment erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.”);
Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 135 (2011).
42. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (“[T]he concepts of equal protection and due
process, both stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The ‘equal
protection of the laws’ is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than ‘due process of
law’ . . . .”).
43. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 725 (6th ed. 2019)
(“Many government laws draw a distinction among people and thus are potentially susceptible to an
equal protection challenge.”); Strauss, supra note 41 (“In most cases of unequal treatment under law,
courts simply defer to the legislative judgment that the distinction is rational; only in certain unusual
circumstances will the courts subject the government’s classifications to more rigorous examination.”).
44. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 727.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 726.

Published by Reading Room, 2021

9

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 9

1054

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:3

potentially improper classification requires proof that there is some
discriminatory purpose behind the law.47
Discrimination based on suspect classifications (such as race or
national origin) is subject to a strict scrutiny test. 48 Under the strict
scrutiny test, the government interest must be compelling, and the
classification must be necessary or narrowly tailored to the
government interest.49 Intermediate scrutiny applies to semi-suspect
or quasi-suspect classifications like gender. 50 In intermediate
scrutiny, the government interest must be important, and the means
must be substantially related to meet the ends.51 All other legislative
actions that do not involve a suspect or semi-suspect classification
are subject to a rational basis review—the minimum level of scrutiny,
which requires that there be a legitimate government interest and that
the means be rationally related to meet the ends.52
Unless a person is seeking to exercise a fundamental right, such as
voting or seeking to place their name on a ballot, wealth
classifications are traditionally subject to a rational basis review. 53
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that poverty is not a suspect
classification and that discrimination against the poor should only
receive a rational basis review. 54
47. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 237 (1976) (“[D]isproportionate impact, standing alone and
without regard to whether it indicated a discriminatory purpose, was held sufficient to establish a
constitutional violation . . . .”); id. at 242 (“Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the
sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.”).
48. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 727.
49. Id.
50. Strauss, supra note 41, at 137.
51. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 727; Strauss, supra note 41, at 137 (“[L]aws that affect a
‘quasi-suspect class’ receive intermediate scrutiny review. Such laws are upheld if the classification is
substantially related to an important government purpose. Striking down laws under an intermediate
level of scrutiny is difficult but not insurmountable.”).
52. Strauss, supra note 41, at 136.
53. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (finding a poll tax violated the
Equal Protection Clause because wealth was not relevant to one’s ability to participate intelligently in
the electoral process); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143–44 (1972) (finding excessive ballot fees
violated the Equal Protection Clause in part because the effect of the exclusionary mechanism’s
limitation would fall more heavily on the less affluent segment of the community).
54. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1973) (“The system of alleged
discrimination and the class it defines have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not
saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the
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C. Proposed Federal Legislation
As long as poverty remains a non-suspect classification,
addressing no-cash policies at a national level would require
legislation. In May of 2019, Congress considered two bills designed
to limit or outright prohibit cashless retailers. 55 The first, the Cash
Always Should Be Honored Act (CASH Act), proposed that the
practice of operating a cashless business would be considered a
violation of section 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.56 The second proposal, the Payment Choice Act of 2019
(Payment Choice Act), allowed a party to commence a civil action
for preventive relief, including pursuing an application for a
permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order against such
persons.57 The Payment Choice Act also allowed for intervention by
the Attorney General.58
Both bills cited Congress’s authority to regulate the practice of
cash retail pursuant to Article I, Section Eight, Clause Three of the
Constitution, the Commerce Clause. 59 The Commerce Clause gives
Congress the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.”60 Under the
Commerce Clause power, Congress can regulate intrastate activities
if there is a rational basis for believing that there is an interstate
effect.61
majoritarian political process. . . . [T]his Court has never heretofore held that wealth discrimination
alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny . . . .”).
55. H.R. 2630, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 2650, 116th Cong. (2019).
56. H.R. 2630 § 2(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any physical retail establishment to refuse to accept
legal tender as payment for any products or services offered for sale by such physical retail
establishment.”).
57. H.R. 2650 § 3(a) (“No person selling or offering goods or services at retail to the public may—
(1) refuse to accept United States legal tender of cash as payment for goods or services; (2) post signs or
notices in, on, or about the business premises of such person stating that cash payment is not accepted;
or (3) charge a higher price to any customer who pays by cash than customarily is charged to a customer
using other forms of payment.”).
58. Id. (“Upon timely application, a court may, in its discretion, permit the Attorney General to
intervene in a civil action brought under this subsection, if the Attorney General certifies that the action
is of general public importance.”).
59. See H.R. 2630; H.R. 2650.
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
61. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 277.
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In deciding whether to act, the government balances competing
goals when examining the viability and constitutionality of a future
cashless society. 62 On the one hand, the risk and frequency of
cyberattacks increase as society moves cashless. 63 On the other,
electronic payments allow the government to track the flow of money
and increase tax collection. 64 Understatement of the amount of taxes
owed by businesses contributes to the federal tax gap—the difference
between what taxpayers owe and what they pay.65 A 10% increase in
the adoption of digital money would result in a $150 billion boost to
consumer spending.66 An increase in payment digitization could net
the government more than $100 billion in incremental taxes. 67
Restricting the use of cash may also reduce the prevalence of money
laundering and other financial crimes. 68
Cash critics say the rising demand for $100 bills but simultaneous
decline in the average number of cash consumer purchases points to
the use of cash in facilitating illegal activities such as money
62. The Future of Money: Coins and Bank Notes: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Monetary Pol’y
and Trade of the H.R. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 115th Cong. 5 (2018) [hereinafter The Future of Money
Hearings].
63. Id. (statement of Leonard Olijar, Director of the United States Bureau of Engraving and Printing)
(“[A] cashless society presents a significant economic risk and neglects to serve those who do not have
access to smartphones, computers, banks, and credit. I believe the 21st century warfare has a significant
cyber component . . . . If your enemy is able to take down your electronic infrastructure or a natural
disaster hits, there will be no way to conduct commerce in a cashless environment, crippling the
economy.”).
64. Jennifer Surane, Digital Payments’ $95 Trillion Tide Undaunted by Cash Holdouts,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 29, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/amp/news/articles/2019-0329/cashless-backlash-in-u-s-fails-to-dent-a-95-trillion-industry [https://perma.cc/ST2Y-2HBU].
65. Jeremy Temkin, Tax Gap Estimates Show That Compliance Rates Remain Unchanged, FORBES
(Oct. 18, 2019, 9:55 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2019/10/18/tax-gap-estimates-showthat-compliance-rates-remain-unchanged/#66bf870f5edd [https://perma.cc/U9TZ-D9WP] (“[T]he IRS
attributes the vast majority of the tax gap to taxpayers who understate the amount of taxes they owe on
timely filed returns ($352 billion), followed by taxpayers who file returns but do not pay their taxes on
time ($50 billion) and non-filers who do not pay their taxes on time ($39 billion).”); Susan Cleary Morse
et al., Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37, 37 (2009) (“Underpayment of
tax on business income is commonly attributed to the receipt of cash.”).
66. Surane, supra note 64.
67. Id.
68. Kurtzman, supra note 21, at 22; Kim, supra note 17 (“Cash serves another purpose: it is the
medium of choice for illicit activities. This helps explain two seemingly contradictory trends: a steady
increase in the demand for U.S. dollars, most notably the $100 bill, even as the average value of
consumer purchases made in cash declines.”).
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laundering, tax evasion, and the purchase of illegal goods. 69
Additionally, the government must consider the cost of producing
coinage.70 Since 2006, the cost of creating pennies and nickels has
exceeded their worth.71
However, the government also has a potential competing interest
in ensuring financial inclusion. 72 Some have argued that legislators
should update the Federal Reserve’s (the Fed) mission to mandate
that the Fed promote efficiency and financial inclusion to benefit
more Americans rather than forcing Americans to work with the Fed
through a bank.73 According to the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), in 2017, 6.5% of U.S. households were
“unbanked,” meaning no one in the household had a checking or
savings account, and 18.7% of U.S. households were “underbanked,”
meaning a household had an account at an insured institution but also
obtained financial products outside of the banking system.74 The

69. Kim, supra note 17 (“In 2017, the $100 bill became the most widely circulated note in
circulation, even exceeding the $1 bill. . . . Cash critics say the rising demand for $100 bills is directly
tied to paper currency’s utility for activities such as money laundering, tax evasion and purchases of
illegal goods.”); KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THE CURSE OF CASH 60 (2016) (“By far the most important area
of tax noncompliance comes from underreporting of business income by individuals who conduct a
significant share of their transactions in cash. . . . Overall, small business owners report less than half
their income and account for 52% of the tax gap.”).
70. The Future of Money Hearings, supra note 62, at 2.
71. Id. at 108 (“The cost of producing a penny has varied from about $0.014 per unit in 2006 to
$0.025 per unit in 2011.”).
72. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ISSUE BRIEF: FINANCIAL INCLUSION IN THE UNITED STATES 1
(2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/20160610_financial_inclusion_ce
a_issue_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/SY6X-T9J6] (“A lack of financial inclusion has broader
consequences for the macroeconomy, having the potential to hurt both equity and efficiency by reducing
access to credit, which can be essential for entrepreneurship, homeownership, and economic
development more broadly.”).
73. Examining Regul. Frameworks for Digit. Currencies and Blockchain: Hearing Before S. Comm.
on Banking, Hous., and Urb. Affs., 116th Cong. 1 (2019) (testimony of Mehrsa Baradaran, Professor of
Law, University of California Irvine School of Law); E. Kylie Norman, Banking at the Fed with
FedAccounts: The Demise of Commercial Banks?, 23 N.C. BANKING INST. 451, 452 (2019) (“To include
this underserved population, there is a current proposal . . . to let all individuals have access to bank
accounts at the Federal Reserve. . . . The FedAccounts proposal seeks to make holding a deposit account
with the central bank—currently limited only to banking institutions—available to individuals and
nonbank businesses.”).
74. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2017: FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED
HOUSEHOLDS 1 (2018).
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most common reason cited for being unbanked was that households
do not have enough money to keep in their accounts. 75
Unbanked families face disproportionately higher costs in financial
transactions and spend almost 10% of their income on financial
transactions alone—more than many of these families spend on
food.76 Many lower-income people find themselves living in banking
deserts, meaning there are no banks in a travelable distance around
them.77 Residents of banking deserts may still have access to
alternative “fringe” providers of financial services such as
check-cashing firms, pawnshops, and payday loan stores.78 In
addition, the homeless population is especially vulnerable in a
cashless society. 79 Many banks require identification and sometimes
a secondary proof of identification such as a utility bill to open an
account.80
75. Id. at 4; Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REGUL. 121, 136 (2004)
(“Low-income households face key barriers to increased saving, and their low income leaves them little
opportunity to save. . . . [T]hey face higher opportunity costs for putting their funds toward savings
rather than current consumption.”).
76. BARADARAN, supra note 15, at 139 (“[T]he average unbanked family with an annual income of
around $25,000 spends about $2,400 per year, almost 10 percent of its income, on financial transactions.
This is more money than these families spend on food.”).
77. Donald P. Morgan et al., Banking Deserts, Branch Closings, and Soft Information, FED. RSRV.
BANK
OF
N.Y.:
LIBERTY
S T.
ECON.
(Mar.
7,
2016),
https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2016/03/banking-deserts-branch-closings-and-softinformation.html [https://perma.cc/NS8B-YDU5] (“[W]e define a banking desert as a census tract—a
relatively homogeneous area or neighborhood containing about 4,000 people—with no branches within
ten miles of the center of the tract . . . .”).
78. Id.; MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL WEALTH
GAP 260 (2017) (“Most black neighborhoods are ‘banking deserts,’ neighborhoods abandoned by
mainstream banks. . . . When banks leave a neighborhood, the sharks usually fill the void. Banking
deserts are left vulnerable to high-cost payday lenders, title lenders, and other fringe banks.”).
79. Kharif & Gmelich, supra note 3; Jay Stanley, Say No to the “Cashless Future” — and to
Cashless Stores, ACLU (Aug. 12, 2019, 3:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacytechnology/consumer-privacy/say-no-cashless-future-and-cashless-stores
[https://perma.cc/U97KMFYR] (“Opening a bank account requires an ID, which many poor and elderly people lack, as well as
other documents such as a utility bill or other proof of address, which the homeless lack, and which
generally create bureaucratic barriers to participating in electronic payment networks.”).
80. 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220 (2020). A bank “must implement a written Customer Identification
Program (CIP).” Id. If a bank is using a non-documentary method to verify a customer’s identity, its CIP
must contain procedures describing the non-documentary methods the bank will use, such as “contacting
a customer; independently verifying the customer’s identity through the comparison of information
provided by the customer with information obtained from a consumer reporting agency, public database,
or other source; checking references with other financial institutions; and obtaining a financial
statement.” Id.
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II. ANALYSIS
There are several avenues that challengers to cashless policies and
similar legislation have used to object to the practice. First,
opponents to cashless policies cite the Coinage Act of 1965 in
arguing that legal tender should be accepted for all debts incurred. 81
Second, plaintiffs have cited the Equal Protection Clause as a
constitutional basis for challenging cash discrimination because it
disproportionately impacts the unbanked and underbanked.
A. Legal Tender
Critics to the cashless movement point to the language printed on
U.S. currency—“legal tender for all debts, public and private”—to
justify their argument that cash should always be accepted. 82 Black’s
Law Dictionary defines “legal tender” as the money (bills and coins)
approved in a country for the payment of debts, the purchase of
goods, and other exchanges for value.83 In the United States, “coins
and currency (including Federal reserve notes and circulating notes
of Federal reserve banks and national banks) are legal tender for all
debts, public charges, taxes, and dues.”84 Although critics opposed to
cashless policies frequently cite the legal tender rule, the rule does
not require an establishment to accept cash as a form of payment. 85
From a contract law perspective, a person does not incur a debt
until after they receive a good or service. 86 As long as a cashless
restaurant discloses their cashless policy upfront, the restaurant is
offering to serve a customer a meal, but they are offering it on their

81. 31 U.S.C. § 5103.
82. Stanley, supra note 79.
83. Legal Tender, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
84. 31 U.S.C. § 5103.
85. Legal Tender Status, supra note 34.
86. Andy Newman, Cash Might Be King, but They Don’t Care, N.Y. TIMES. (Dec. 25, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/25/nyregion/no-cash-money-cashless-credit-debit-card.html
[https://perma.cc/WYQ4-AS2T].
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terms.87 If a customer consumes the meal, they have accepted the
terms of the contract.88
Challenges to cashless policies that employ the Legal Tender Act
as a basis for the claim have been mostly unsuccessful. 89 In Nemser
v. New York City Transit Authority, bus riders brought a challenge to
the transit authority’s policy of refusing to accept cash for bus fare.90
The Supreme Court of New York held that the Legal Tender Act
“cannot be interpreted to require acceptance of a particular
denomination of currency . . . for bus fare.”91
Similarly, in Rosen v. Continental Airlines, Inc., an airline
passenger challenged Continental’s “cashless cabin” policy on a
flight when he could not make purchases because he did not have a
debit or credit card.92 The passenger challenged the practice, in part,
under the Coinage Act. 93 The U.S. District Court for the District of
New Jersey rejected his challenge under the Federal Coinage Act and
stated that the Act “provides nothing more than a definition of legal
tender” and “does not create a cause of action.”94

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Erdberg v. On Line Info. Servs., Inc., No. 12-CV-3883, 2013 WL 5570062, at *13–15 (N.D. Ala.
Oct. 9, 2013) (challenging the court’s mandatory e-filing policy for all attorneys in civil matters);
Martinez v. Mattern, No. H-05-3237, 2006 WL 1295571, at *13–14 (S.D. Tex. May 10, 2006)
(challenging a water utility’s no-cash policy).
90. 140 Misc. 2d 369, 369–70 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988) (finding reasonable the New York City Transit
Authority’s decision to limit the acceptance of cash to locations where its employees, with appropriate
safeguards, could issue tickets).
91. Id. at 370.
92. Civ. No. 10-5859, 2011 WL 1467209, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 18, 2011), aff’d, 62 A.3d 321 (N.J.
Super. Cit. App. Div. 2013) (stating that the plaintiff was unable to purchase a headset and cocktail on a
flight because he did not possess a debit or credit card and the airline had a no-cash cabin policy).
93. Id.
94. Id. The plaintiff also attempted to bring a class action claim on behalf of all low-income
individuals and unaccompanied minors that have traveled on Continental flights because the cashless
policy denied them the opportunity to purchase amenities on those flights. Id. Since the plaintiff was not
a member of either of those classes, he did not have standing as a representative of the class, and his
claim was denied. Id.
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B. Constitutional Challenges
In addition to challenging cashless policies under the Coinage Act,
several cases have raised equal protection claims. 95 In Erdberg v. On
Line Information Services, for instance, the plaintiff challenged the
Supreme Court of Alabama’s mandatory e-filing policy as violating
equal protection.96 The court rejected the equal protection claim
because the plaintiff failed to adequately allege that he was treated
disparately from other “similarly situated” persons.97 Although the
plaintiff alleged that the policy violated his fundamental right of
access to the courts, the court found that what was actually at issue
was the additional fee imposed on civil attorneys, thus subjecting the
policy to only a rational basis review. 98
Currently, a court will uphold legislative actions that burden poor
persons as a class under the Equal Protection Clause if the actions
have any rational relationship to a legitimate end of government. 99 In
the absence of infringement on some fundamental right or interest, a
classification that operates to disadvantage the poor is not suspect.100
In such circumstances, a court will use the traditional rational basis
standard of review.101

95. See, e.g., Martinez v. Mattern, No. H-05-3237, 2006 WL 1295571, at *4 (S.D. Tex. May 10,
2006) (upholding a water utility’s no-cash policy and finding that the utility had a legitimate
governmental interest in protecting the funds it received in payment for water services where the
implementation of the water utility’s policy followed a robbery and where the court found that the
policy was rationally related to that interest).
96. No. 12-CV-3883, 2013 WL 5570062, at *13–15 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 9, 2013).
97. Id.
98. Id. at *4.
99. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43; Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel, Reconciling Rational-Basis Review:
When Does Rational Basis Bite?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2071–72 (2015) (“Rational-basis review, the
most deferential form of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, rarely invalidates legislation.
Between the 1971 and 2014 Terms, the Supreme Court has held laws violative of equal protection under
rational-basis scrutiny only seventeen times, out of over one hundred challenges analyzed under
rational-basis scrutiny.”).
100. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216–17 (1982) (“The Equal
Protection Clause was intended as a restriction on state legislative action inconsistent with elemental
constitutional premises. Thus we have treated as presumptively invidious those classifications that
disadvantage a ‘suspect class,’ or that impinge upon the exercise of a ‘fundamental right.’”).
101. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43.
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To move from a rational basis review to a strict scrutiny standard
on legislation that disadvantages the poor, such as permitting retailers
and other entities to implement cashless policies, the U.S. Supreme
Court would likely have to recognize the poor as a suspect class. In
determining whether a group should be considered a suspect class, a
court will look at whether the person is a “discrete and insular
minorit[y].”102 The Supreme Court considers several factors in
determining whether a group should be classified as a suspect
class.103 First, the Court assesses whether the group has suffered
historical discrimination. 104 Second, the Court evaluates whether the
group “exhibit[s] obvious, immutable, or distinguishing
characteristics that define them as a discrete group.”105 Third, the
Court considers whether the group is politically powerless.106 Fourth,
the Court determines whether the classifying trait—here, wealth—is
relevant to the group’s ability to contribute to society. 107 The poor
meet the last criterion because a person’s wealth does not necessarily
govern an individual’s ability to contribute to society. 108 Thus, this
Note focuses its analysis on the first three factors.
1. Historical Discrimination
If a group has historically faced discrimination, the Court may find
that they fall into a suspect classification. 109 However, the Court has
102. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”).
103. Maurice R. Dyson, Rethinking Rodriguez After Citizens United: The Poor As a Suspect Class in
High-Poverty Schools, 24 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 12–13 (2016).
104. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–86 (1973) (applying the suspect classification
analysis to sex discrimination).
105. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (holding that a challenge to a statute that
distinguished parents, children, and siblings in determining eligibility for food stamps met the rational
basis review and that parents, children, and siblings were not a suspect class for purposes of equal
protection analysis).
106. Id.
107. Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations and the
Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 333, 343 (2016).
108. Id. at 344.
109. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1973) (outlining the “traditional
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not set forth precise criteria for finding historic abuse such as the
amount, type, or recentness of past discrimination. 110 Without precise
guidelines, courts have relied on comparing the discriminatory
history of the group to the experiences of African Americans or
women.111
Impoverished persons have faced discrimination throughout
American history, much of which continues today. 112 For instance,
various laws throughout U.S. history have prohibited vagrancy. 113
Laws, such as prohibitions against panhandling or restrictions on
sleeping or bathing in public, have been used against those living in
poverty.114
A report analyzing the laws in over a hundred cities and
metropolitan areas throughout the United States found that in 2016
47% of cities prohibited sitting and lying down in public, 32%
outlawed loitering citywide, and 6% restricted food sharing.115
Compared to a decade earlier, there were nearly twice as many
citywide camping and loitering bans and more than twice as many
bans against living in vehicles.116 People living in poor
neighborhoods are more likely to be the target of police harassment,
brutality, and killings than those in affluent areas.117 Although
advocates for the homeless population have mounted challenges to
anti-homeless laws by arguing that these laws violate the First,
indicia of suspectness,” which includes a history of purposeful unequal treatment).
110. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces
of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945, 981 (1975).
111. Strauss, supra note 41, at 151.
112. Id. at 140.
113. Jennifer E. Watson, When No Place Is Home: Why the Homeless Deserve Suspect Classification,
88 IOWA L. REV. 501, 523 (2003) (“History reveals discrimination against homeless persons began in
the fourteenth century; this discrimination continues to confront the homeless today.”).
114. See Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341, 353–56 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated, 903
F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990), for the historical treatment of begging.
115. Trevor Bach, Will Fines and Jail Time Fix the Homelessness Crisis?, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 7, 2019,
1:25 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/cities/articles/2019-10-07/us-cities-are-increasingly-crackingdown-on-homelessness; NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS
2019: ENDING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 56 (2019) [hereinafter HOUSING
NOT HANDCUFFS], http://nlchp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/HOUSING-NOT-HANDCUFFS-2019FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/KB22-KCRZ].
116. Bach, supra note 115.
117. Dyson, supra note 103, at 28.
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Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, only some of the
challenges have been successful. 118
Before the ratification of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment in 1964,
poll taxes were used to disenfranchise poor voters.119 The
Amendment prohibits both Congress and the states from conditioning
the right to vote in federal elections on payment of a poll tax or other
types of taxes.120 Even today, voter identification laws are being used
as a tool to disenfranchise poor voters. 121
2. Immutable Trait
Members of a suspect class often share an immutable trait. 122
However, the Court has not articulated a clear, definitive definition of
immutability.123 In Frontiero v. Richardson, the Court defined an
immutable trait as a “characteristic determined solely by the accident
of birth.”124 Some courts have expanded the definition, and now
immutability depends on whether the trait is difficult to change. 125
The trait may be difficult to change because it is out of a person’s
118. Joanna Laine, From Criminalization to Humanization: Ending Discrimination Against the
Homeless, 39 HARBINGER 1, 4 (2015).
119. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality of Georgia’s
requirement of the payment of a poll tax to vote in state elections), overruled by Harper v. Va. State Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
120. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any
primary or other election . . . shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason
of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.”).
121. Sari Horwitz, Getting a Photo ID So You Can Vote Is Easy. Unless You’re Poor, Black, Latino
or Elderly, WASH. POST (May 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/gettinga-photo-id-so-you-can-vote-is-easy-unless-youre-poor-black-latino-or-elderly/2016/05/23/8d5474ec20f0-11e6-8690-f14ca9de2972_story.html [https://perma.cc/7SB8-YRCX] (“[M]any election experts
say that the process for obtaining a photo ID can be far more difficult than it looks for hundreds of
thousands of people across the country who do not have the required photo identification cards. Those
most likely to be affected are elderly citizens, African Americans, Hispanics and low-income
residents.”).
122. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). Examples of immutable traits are a
person’s sex, race, or national origin. Id.
123. Strauss, supra note 41, at 162.
124. 411 U.S. at 688, 690–91 (finding that the differential treatment of male and female military
personnel for purposes of determining dependent benefits was unconstitutional because “classifications
based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect,
and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny”).
125. Strauss, supra note 41, at 162.
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control or because to change the trait would require too high of a
cost.126
The official poverty rate in 2018 was 11.8%.127 The number of
people in poverty in 2018 was 38.1 million. 128 Every year, the U.S.
Census Bureau uses a set of dollar value thresholds that vary by
family size and composition to determine who is in poverty. 129 In
2018, for example, the poverty threshold for a family of four was an
annual income of $26,324.130
Although poverty is not a completely immutable trait, it is
something one is born into and can be difficult to change. 131 The
likelihood of escaping poverty for a child born into impoverished
conditions is low.132 Income mobility varies across the country,
depending on where a child grows up.133 Children in parts of the
Midwest, the Northeast, and the West have greater chances of
upward mobility.134 However, the likelihood of escaping poverty for
children in the South and portions of the Rust Belt is much lower.135
For example, a child born in Atlanta, Georgia, or Charlotte, North
Carolina, into a household making less than $25,000 a year has only
a 4% chance to move into the upper 20% of income strata over a
lifetime.136 A family’s wealth is more likely to impact whether a

126. Id.
127. JESSICA SEMEGA ET AL., INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2018: U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU 1 (2020), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2019/demo/p60266.pdf [https://perma.cc/SD2E-WH9U].
128. Id.
129. Id. at 49.
130. Id.
131. Christina Pazzanese, The Costs of Inequality: Increasingly, It’s the Rich and the Rest, HARV.
GAZETTE (Feb. 8, 2016), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2016/02/the-costs-of-inequalityincreasingly-its-the-rich-and-the-rest [https://perma.cc/8CGW-ST8K].
132. Id.; Jason DeParle, Harder for Americans to Rise from Lower Rungs, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/us/harder-for-americans-to-rise-from-lower-rungs.html
[https://perma.cc/V6RE-XDCY] (“A project . . . found that 42 percent of American men raised in the
bottom fifth of incomes stay there as adults. . . . Meanwhile, just 8 percent of American men at the
bottom rose to the top fifth.”).
133. Pazzanese, supra note 131.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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person can pursue an education or a high-paying job.137 Those living
in poverty often live in resource-poor communities with subpar
schools, limited social connections, and limited opportunities to
secure a higher education.138
3. Lack of Political Power
In determining whether a suspect classification is warranted, the
Court also reviews whether the group was powerless to protect
themselves via the political process.139 Two different approaches to
measuring political power have emerged. 140 The first is the
descriptive representation approach, which focuses on the extent to
which the group’s members occupy political offices.141 The second
approach focuses on whether a group has benefited from favorable
legislation or executive action. 142
From a descriptive representation approach, poor people are
underrepresented in politics.143 Though working-class jobs (defined
as manual labor, service industry positions, and clerical jobs) make
up more than half of the economy in the United States, politicians
from the working-class make up less than 3% of the average state
legislature.144 On a national level, the average member of Congress
spent less than 2% of their career in working-class positions.145
137. BARADARAN, supra note 78, at 250.
138. Id.
139. Ross & Li, supra note 108, at 325; Bertrall L. Ross II, Administering Suspect Classes, 66 DUKE
L.J. 1807, 1817 (2017) (“Justices ultimately justified the denial of suspect-class status to new groups in
part on the basis . . . that such groups have sufficient political power to defend themselves in the
political process. This determination, however, has been based on an unsubstantiated and undefended
measure of political power that was designed to exclude all groups from special protection.” (footnote
omitted)).
140. Ross & Li, supra note 108, at 326.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Nicholas Carnes, Working-Class People Are Underrepresented in Politics. The Problem Isn’t
Voters,
VOX
(Oct.
24,
2018,
8:00
AM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/10/24/18009856/working-class-income-inequality-randy-bryce-alexandria-ocasio-cortez
[https://perma.cc/Q6K9-KPDL].
144. Id.
145. Id. (“The exclusion of working-class people from American political institutions isn’t a recent
phenomenon.”); Nicholas Carnes, Why Are So Few US Politicians from the Working Class?, THE
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From a favorable legislation approach, a stronger case can be made
that the poor have political power, but it is uncertain whether the
legislation is in response to political influence of the poor or for other
reasons.146 There are several federal and state laws and programs that
are targeted at assisting low-income residents.147 The Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) provides food-purchasing
assistance to low-income people.148 Several programs assist
low-income children and families, such as Head Start, which
provides early childhood education, health, and nutrition services. 149
More recently, the expansion of Medicaid and increased minimum
wage across several states work to help lower-income people.150 On
the other hand, as discussed supra, state and local governments
continue to pass legislation targeted at homeless people and
lower-income residents.151
Participation in the political process, particularly the ability to
vote, is also limited for the poor.152 At least twenty-four states have
implemented laws aimed at restricting voting since 2010. 153 Several
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
4,
2018,
5:00
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/commentisfree/2018/oct/04/few-us-politicians-working-class [https://perma.cc/Z6TG-LFK3] (“In
nationwide surveys of people campaigning for state legislatures in 2012 and 2014, candidates from
working-class jobs made up just 4% of both Republican and Democratic candidates.”).
146. Ross & Li, supra note 108, at 328 (“Recent social science studies of political inequality provide
strong evidence that the poor lack political power, as defined by elected officials’ and legislatures’
responsiveness to the group’s preferences on an array of social, economic, and foreign policy issues,
calling into question the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the passage of favorable legislation.”).
147. Id.
148. See generally Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.: FOOD &
NUTRITION
SERV.,
https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program
[https://perma.cc/C5B7-JAYY].
149. Head Start Services, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.: ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAMS. (Nov. 3,
2020), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/ohs/about/head-start [https://perma.cc/G8SY-XPZC].
150. Benjamin D. Sommers & Donald Oellerich, The Poverty-Reducing Effect of Medicaid, 32 J.
HEALTH ECON. 816, 829 (2013) (“Medicaid and [the Children’s Health Insurance Program] play a
significant role in poverty reduction for millions of Americans, in all age groups. Beyond the program’s
presumed primary benefit of improved access to care and health, . . . Medicaid has significant poverty
reducing effects of a similar order of magnitude as other dedicated anti-poverty government
programs.”).
151. HOUSING NOT HANDCUFFS, supra note 115, at 77.
152. Jordan Malter, Why Poor People Still Aren’t Voting, CNN BUSINESS (Aug. 5, 2015, 10:02 PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2015/08/05/news/economy/poor-people-voting-rights/ [https://perma.cc/HRX9EPS7].
153. Terry Gross, Republican Voter Suppression Efforts Are Targeting Minorities, Journalist Says,
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states have enacted stricter voter identification laws, which on the
face appear to be neutral, but poor people are more likely to lack the
identification necessary to vote. 154 The U.S. Supreme Court has been
reluctant to invalidate voter identification laws, reasoning that the
state’s interest in preventing voter fraud outweighs the burdens
placed on voters.155 Other factors, such as poll closings or reductions
in election staff, have led to other barriers such as long lines and
limited polling hours.156 These barriers have a disproportionate
impact on the poor who face insecure employment or inflexible work
schedules.157 In the 2018 election, the most common reason cited for
not voting by those with a family income of less than $20,000 was
“[t]oo busy, conflicting schedule.”158 As a result, the poor’s
participation in voting is diminished, and the poor would likely be
considered a group with little to no political power. 159
III. PROPOSAL
There are two possible approaches to protect the impoverished and
their ability to use cash in financial transactions. First, the U.S.
Supreme Court should classify poverty as a suspect class and apply
strict scrutiny to any legislation that impacts their ability to
NPR (Oct. 23, 2018, 2:04 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/23/659784277/republican-votersuppression-efforts-are-targeting-minorities-journalist-says [https://perma.cc/TVP9-B9RJ].
154. Id.
155. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008). In his dissent, Justice Souter
pointed out that an estimated 43,000 Indiana citizens lacked the proper identification to be able to vote,
and it would require spending anywhere from $3 to $100 to obtain the requisite documentation, in
addition to travel costs associated with completing the process. Id. at 215–19 (Souter, J., dissenting).
156. Anna North, Why Long Lines at Polling Places Are a Voting Rights Issue, VOX (Nov. 6, 2018,
4:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/11/6/18068506/midterm-election-voting-lines-new-york-georgia
(“In urban counties where a majority of voters are people of color, voters lost an average of seven
polling places and more than 200 poll workers, according to USA Today. Meanwhile, in counties where
more than 90 percent of the population was white, voters lost just two locations and two workers on
average during that time period.”).
157. Id. (“[C]losures have a disproportionate impact on poor voters or those with insecure
employment or inflexible work schedules, many of whom are people of color.”).
158. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEMBER 2018, at
tbl.10
(2019),
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/voting-and-registration/p20583.html [https://perma.cc/UV24-FACN].
159. North, supra note 156.
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participate in the marketplace freely. 160 Second, Congress should
enact federal legislation to prohibit cashless policies to put a stop to
the practice because cashless policies discriminate against those who
do not have access to banking and financial institutions.161
A. Classifying Poverty As a Suspect Class
The U.S. Supreme Court’s current laissez-faire review of
legislation impacting the impoverished has left little protection for
those who need it. 162 The lack of strict scrutiny has allowed a climate
of scapegoating, stereotyping, and stigmatization against the poor to
continue.163 Some argue that government policies, such as criminal
justice policies, decisions about funding for education, and policies
related to housing, contribute to the intensification and persistence of
poverty.164
Some scholars argue that the judiciary is the most effective branch
for making decisions regarding fundamental rights, including the
rights of the poor. 165 Courts are not hindered by the same time
constraints and media influence as the legislature and can deliberate
on complex issues.166 Courts are also more likely to have expertise in
deciding fundamental rights questions.167 With the protection of
160. Rebecca Bellan, As More Cities Ban Cashless Businesses, New York Wants to Follow,
BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Mar. 6, 2019, 1:25 PM), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/03/cashlesscash-free-ban-bill-new-york-retail-discrimination/584203 [https://perma.cc/2WTL-NYRQ] (“Cashless
institutions encourage a FinTech Jim Crow by restricting the places where people of color can shop, eat,
and receive basic services . . . .” (quoting Edgard Laborde, deputy political director of the Retail
Wholesale Department Store Union)).
161. Kim, supra note 17 (“Barriers to banking and technology may deny portions of the population
access to basic goods and services . . . . Others may not have the access, finances or skills to acquire
formal banking services or a smartphone, or simply do not like banks.”).
162. Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1277,
1285 (1993).
163. Id.
164. Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 45 (1987); Michael Tanner, How the Government Helps Keep People Poor, N.Y.
POST, https://nypost.com/2018/12/05/how-the-government-helps-keep-people-poor
[https://perma.cc/FP3G-K9CF] (Dec. 5, 2018, 7:46 PM).
165. DAVID BILCHITZ, POVERTY AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: THE JUSTIFICATION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 119 (2007).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 122–23.
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lifetime tenure, the judicial branch does not face the same pressures
as legislatures to make decisions favoring the majority opinion and is
thus able to protect the interests of all citizens.168
Once the Court establishes the poor as a suspect classification, any
government classification included in legislation or related to a state
action that disfavors the poor may be challenged on equal protection
grounds under the Fourteenth Amendment.169 The Government
would then carry the burden of showing that the classification is
necessary and narrowly tailored to promote a compelling interest of
the State.170 A change in the classification of the poor as a suspect
class must come from the judicial system because the classification
hinges on judicial interpretation of the Constitution. 171
Despite the ability to recognize the poor as a suspect class, the
U.S. Supreme Court is not likely to do so for a variety of reasons.172
Since the 1970s, the Court has been reluctant to apply any form of
heightened scrutiny to wealth discrimination cases. 173 In fact, since
the Court announced a standard for determining which classes are
suspect under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has not deemed
a new class as suspect.174 The Court declined to extend the suspect
classification to groups such as the elderly, the disabled, and the
poor.175
168. Id. at 124–25.
169. Dyson, supra note 103, at 8.
170. Id.
171. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 586 (“In a very famous footnote in United States v. Carolene
Products Co., the Supreme Court articulated the idea that different constitutional claims would be
subjected to varying levels of review.”).
172. Ross, supra note 139, at 1815.
173. Id. at 1814 (“Many legal scholars claim that the suspect-class doctrine is dead. It has been over
forty years since the Court recognized a new suspect class, a determination that triggers heightened
scrutiny of laws that discriminate against the class and creates a presumption of unconstitutionality for
those laws.”).
174. Ross & Li, supra note 108, at 325; Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L.
REV. 481, 485 (2004) (“The Court did not articulate detailed indicia for discerning which classifications
should fill this set until the early 1970s—decades after it first referred to race as a suspect classification.
Almost immediately, the ‘set’ closed when a majority of the Court accorded sex-based classifications
quasi-suspect status. It has not expanded since.” (footnotes omitted)).
175. Goldberg, supra note 174; Ross, supra note 139, at 1814–15 (“[T]he Supreme Court has denied
or avoided deciding claims of entitlement to suspect-class protection by the poor, the elderly, the
disabled, and the LGBTQ community.”).
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Although the Court’s reasoning is unknown, scholars have
hypothesized several reasons why the Court may be hesitant to
extend suspect classifications. First, the Court may be reluctant to
extend special protection to too many groups.176 One fear is that the
Court may intervene too frequently in the political process and
require even more intervention.177 Judges are reluctant to
second-guess decisions made by the legislatures when it comes to
economic and social policy choices. 178
Second, the Court may have embraced the originalist view of the
Fourteenth Amendment and intended only to protect African
Americans.179 Under this interpretation, no other groups would be
entitled to protection under the Equal Protection Clause. 180
Supporters of the originalist view argue that the Court has used the
Fourteenth Amendment to assume power under the guise of
constitutional interpretation, which was not the original intention. 181
Third, there may be a fear that protecting the poor as a suspect
class may have further implications, such as creating a constitutional
right to government benefits like welfare, food, shelter, or medical
176. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In his
dissent in Sugarman, Justice Rehnquist expressed concern that the classification of minorities would
become too broad:
Our society, consisting of over 200 million individuals of multitudinous origins,
customs, tongues, beliefs, and cultures is, to say the least, diverse. It would hardly
take extraordinary ingenuity for a lawyer to find “insular and discrete” minorities at
every turn in the road. Yet, unless the Court can precisely define and constitutionally
justify both the terms and analysis it uses, these decisions today stand for the
proposition that the Court can choose a “minority” it “feels” deserves “solicitude”
and thereafter prohibit the States from classifying that “minority” differently from the
“majority.”
Id.
177. Ross, supra note 139, at 1813.
178. Julie A. Nice, Whither the Canaries: On the Exclusion of Poor People from Equal Constitutional
Protection, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 1023, 1033 (2012); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)
(“In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.”).
179. Ross, supra note 139, at 1815; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43, at 752–53 (“[T]he initial Supreme
Court decisions construing the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause suggested that it could be used only to
protect [B]lacks.”).
180. Ross, supra note 139, at 1815.
181. Johnathan G. O’Neill, Raoul Berger and the Restoration of Originalism, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 253,
264 (2001).
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care.182 If the Court treats wealth as a suspect class, lower courts will
adhere to precedent and will scrutinize laws that discriminate against
the group in other contexts. 183 The broad application of the suspect
classification to other contexts may deter the Court from acting and
providing special judicial protection to the poor. 184 The Court may
also be reluctant to overrule precedent with respect to extending
suspect classification to the poor. 185 Despite the unlikelihood of the
Court recognizing the poor as a suspect class, the Court should
rectify the past decisions and provide the poor greater constitutional
protection.
B. Enacting Federal Legislation
Even if the U.S. Supreme Court refuses to recognize the poor as a
suspect class, Congress should enact federal legislation targeted at
prohibiting cashless retailers under the Commerce Clause power—
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. 186 Federal
legislation enacted under Congress’s Commerce Clause power would
restrict private businesses’ abilities to establish cashless policies but
would not limit such restrictions to federal and state actions.
Federal legislation is preferable to address the problem to ensure
consistency and alleviate the need for state and local governments to
enact legislation. Congress should recognize that allowing retailers to
establish no-cash policies restricts the ability of consumers who are
unbanked or underbanked from participating fully in the economy. 187

182. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 43.
183. Ross, supra note 139, at 1835.
184. Id.
185. Ross & Li, supra note 108, at 342 (“In the early 1970s, the Court decided the case of San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, which would serve as the foundation for the Court’s
eventual denial of suspect class status to the poor. The irony is that while the Court would later cite
Rodriguez to support its denial of suspect class status to the poor, the Court never actually decided the
question in the case.” (footnotes omitted)).
186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power to . . . regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes . . . .”).
187. Bourke et al., supra note 12 (“Cash made up nearly 40 percent of in-person transactions in 2017,
according to the Federal Reserve, and, although its usage continues to decline, cash is still the most
widely used payment type.”).
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The federal legislation would help impoverished consumers preserve
their freedom of consumer choice. 188
To effectively preserve consumer choice, federal legislation should
incorporate several key terms already enacted or proposed by state
and local legislators. First, there should be an overall ban on refusing
to accept cash with a limited number of exceptions.189 The primary
exception should be to exempt online retailers and transactions
completed over the telephone or through the mail. Ideally, the
legislation should mirror Rhode Island’s cash payment bill, which
simply states: “All retail establishments shall accept legal tender
currency when offered as payment. Provided, the provisions of this
section shall not apply to online purchases or sales made over the
internet.”190 The legislation should focus on brick-and-mortar
retailers, defined as any place of business operating at a fixed,
permanent physical premises. 191
Second, retailers should be prohibited from posting notices stating
that cash is not accepted or discouraging potential customers from
using cash during the transaction. 192 Even if the retailer ultimately
does accept cash, a sign discouraging the use of cash defeats the
purpose of the cashless policy prohibition. Third, retailers should be
prohibited from charging higher prices to those customers who
choose to pay with cash. 193 Although charging a higher fee for paying
cash is not a typical practice currently, it could become an issue in
the future as the cashless movement grows if a retailer is attempting
188. Id. (“Millions of consumers rely on cash to make purchases, either by necessity or by choice.”).
189. See, e.g., PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-1132(1) (2019) (“A person selling or offering for sale goods or
services at retail is prohibited from refusing to accept cash as a form of payment to purchase goods or
services.”).
190. 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-30 (2019).
191. S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art. 55, § 5502 (2019) (“‘Brick-and-Mortar Business’ means any place
of business operating at a fixed, permanent physical premises. Brick-and-Mortar Business does not
include any business not operating at a physical premises in San Francisco (one example being a
business operating in the City exclusively via the Internet without any physical premises in the
City) . . . .”).
192. PHILA., PA., CODE § 9-1132(1)(b) (“A person selling or offering for sale goods or services at
retail shall not . . . [p]ost signs on the premises that cash payment is not accepted . . . .”).
193. Id. § 9-1132(1)(c) (“A person selling or offering for sale goods or services at retail shall
not . . . [c]harge a higher price to customers who pay cash than they would pay using any other form of
payment.”).
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to discourage the use of cash. Some retailers add surcharges for
customers using a credit card for purchases. 194 Although retailers
have the right to add surcharges to transactions when a customer is
paying with a credit card, ten states have enacted regulations
prohibiting retailers from imposing a surcharge on the buyer for
using a credit card in lieu of payment by cash. 195
Federal legislation, rather than state laws or local ordinances, will
overcome jurisdictional issues that prevent state and local legislation
from reaching certain businesses. For example, the Airline
Deregulation Act includes language that makes airlines’ policy
decisions related to a price, route, or service immune to state laws. 196
A federally enacted law will also trump any state and local
ordinances that contradict the federal legislation and ensure
consumers, particularly poor consumers, are treated consistently
across the country.197
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) should primarily handle
enforcement of the federal statute.198 The FTC is a bipartisan federal
agency with a dual mission of protecting consumers and promoting
competition.199 The FTC is divided into three bureaus: the Bureau of
194. Justin Pritchard, Credit Card Surcharges: Why It Can Cost More to Use Credit, THE BALANCE
(Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.thebalance.com/credit-card-surcharges-315423 [https://perma.cc/A7S8D2UL] (“If merchants decide to use credit card surcharges, they must: [c]learly disclose the fact that
there is a surcharge to you before the transaction[,] [d]isplay the credit card surcharge on the receipt[,]
[and] [k]eep surcharges below 4% of the transaction, or the amount of fees the merchant pays to the
credit card companies, whichever is less.” (emphasis added)).
195. See CAL CIV. CODE § 1748.1(a) (West 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 5-2-212(1) (2019); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 42-133ff(a) (2019); FLA. STAT. § 501.0117 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-2-403 (2010);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140D, § 28A (2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 8-509 (2011); N.Y. GEN.
BUS. LAW § 518 (McKinney 2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A, § 2-417 (2019); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 604A.0021 (West 2017).
196. Airline Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (“Except as provided in this subsection, a State,
political subdivision of a State, or political authority of at least [two] States may not enact or enforce a
law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service
of an air carrier that may provide air transportation under this subpart.”).
197. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
198. Our
History,
FED.
TRADE
COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history
[https://perma.cc/AB3Z-NY49] (“The Federal Trade Commission was created on September 26, 1914,
when President Woodrow Wilson signed the Federal Trade Commission Act into law.”).
199. What We Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do
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Consumer Protection, the Bureau of Competition, and the Bureau of
Economics.200 The cashless ban would fall into similar consumer
protection statutes that the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection
currently enforces, such as the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,
which prohibits deceptive, unfair, and abusive debt collection
practices.201
FTC investigations can be initiated in several ways.202 An
investigation may stem from a consumer complaint made directly to
the FTC, from a business alerting the FTC to a practice of one of
their competitors, from a member of Congress forwarding the
complaint from a constituent, or from the direct observations of FTC
employees during their interactions with a business.203 Following an
investigation, if the FTC has “reason to believe” that a law has been
violated, the FTC may initiate an enforcement action through either
an administrative or judicial process. 204
Penalties for non-compliance should mirror New Jersey’s law,
which prohibits a retailer from requiring a buyer to pay using credit
or to prohibit cash as payment to purchase the goods or services.205 A
person in violation of the law would be subject to a civil penalty of
up to $2,500 for a first offense and up to $5,000 for a second
offense.206 These penalties would make most businesses think twice
before violating the law because the cost of multiple violations would
far outweigh the costs associated with facilitating cash transactions.
[https://perma.cc/96U3-LKAP].
200. CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW & POLICY 90 (2016); see
also Federal Trade Commission, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Federal-TradeCommission [https://perma.cc/5C9T-CJ62].
201. Statutes Enforced or Administered by the Commission, FED. TRADE COMM’N,
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes [https://perma.cc/2Q6D-KD4B] (“The Commission has
enforcement or administrative responsibilities under more than 70 laws.”); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p.
202. 16 C.F.R. § 2.2 (“A complaint or request for Commission action may be submitted via the
Commission’s web-based complaint site . . . by a telephone call . . . or by a signed statement setting
forth the alleged violation of law with such supporting information as is available . . . .”).
203. HOOFNAGLE, supra note 200, at 103.
204. A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative, Law Enforcement, and
Rulemaking Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcementauthority [https://perma.cc/8EU3-35S2].
205. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.33(a) (2019).
206. Id.
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The CASH Act, one of the bills recently proposed in Congress,
closely aligns with the suggested provisions. The CASH Act states
that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any physical retail establishment to
refuse to accept legal tender as payment for any products or services
offered for sale.”207 Online and telephone transactions are exempt
from the compliance in the proposed bill. The CASH Act designates
enforcement to the FTC and classifies the practice as an “unfair or
deceptive act, or practice,” and allows for the FTC to promulgate
regulations to implement enforcement of the bill. 208
CONCLUSION
If the current trend of businesses instituting cashless policies gains
momentum, the impact on the poor will be devastating. 209 Many
impoverished people are unbanked and underbanked and lack access
to banking and financial institutions.210 Without judicial and
legislative intervention, those lacking access to banks will be shut out
of the economy. Judicial intervention in the form of recognition of
the poor as a suspect class is necessary to protect the poor.211 A
suspect classification will protect the poor from state and local laws
that limit their ability to transact with the government and
government agencies. 212 In addition, federal legislation is necessary
to ensure that private businesses engaged in interstate commerce are
also prohibited from implementing no-cash policies.213 Congress
should proactively ensure the poor’s protection and ability to
participate in the marketplace.

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

H.R. 2630, 116th Cong. (2019).
Id.
Bellafante, supra note 12.
BARADARAN, supra note 15, at 139.
Loffredo, supra note 162.
Dyson, supra note 103, at 8.
Kim, supra note 17.
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